March 16, 2000
Memories: True or False
by Durand F. Jacobs Ph.D.
Assembly Room, A. K. Smiley Public Library
Biography of Durand F. Jacobs Ph.D.
·Diplomate in Clinical Psychology, American Board of
·Chief, Psychology Service, Jerry L. Pettis Memorial
veterans Hospital, Loma Linda, Calif. 1977-1990
·Professor of Psychiatry, Loma Linda University School of
Medicine, Loma Linda, Calif.
·Clinical Professor, Fuller Graduate School of Psychology,
·President, California State Psychological Association,
·Vice-President, National Council on Problem Gambling,
·Charter member California Council on Compulsive Gambling;
contributing editor to the Journal of Gambling Behavior.
·Dr. Jacobs has been involved in treatment, training of
professionals, and research on addictive behaviors over the past thirty years. He was
instrumental in establishing the first inpatient treatment program for compulsive gamblers
He has reported his research on compulsive gambling and
means for identifying and intervening high risk youth at national and international
conferences and in a number of journals and books.
His work describing gambling among teenagers and the
special vulnerability of children of parents who gamble excessively appeared as two
chapters in Compulsive Gambling: Theory. Research and Practice (Lexington Press), edited
by Howard Shaffer et al. This book is based on presentations made at the First
Invitational Symposium on Compulsive Gambling, held June 3-4, 1988 at the Center for
Addictive Studies, Harvard University Medical School ·Dr. Jacobs is a recipient of the
Herman Goldman Foundation Award:
"In recognition of your dedication, support, and
continuing research efforts highlighting the consequences of compulsive gambling on
families and youth. "
·Recipient of award from Harvard University, Division of
Addictions ( April 7, 1995) "For lifelong contributions to Youth Gambling"
Memories: True Or False
Are you really getting the straight story? Is it complete,
unabridged, just as it actually was, when
you hear (or when you, yourself profess) a recollection of a past event? Does the story remain the same year after year? Does it change after a little probing for details? Does it remain the same, no matter who its
told to? Does another eye-witness to the same
event tell the same story?
Perhaps we can settle for an endorsement that most
stories we hear and tell are as true as true can be. And they are . . . given the circumstances that
prevailed within us and around us at the time we perceived the original happening, and
given the circumstances within us and around us when, later, we recount the story of what
Were we able to compare a snapshot or videotape of a
past event with the images captured by our
subjective eye, it would reveal that we react to only a limited part of the total context. Our focused attention on one object or activity
results in an inattention to other things that co-existed at that time. Consequently the latter things tend to be
partially or completely blurred out of the memory encoding of the event.
For example, regular and problem gamblers when asked to
recall the results of their gambling experiences during the past year overwhelming will
report - often at length and in great detail - their winning times with little reference
to their losing times during the same year. Next
in frequency among these gamblers are those who will say, Oh, Ive come out
Either of these sets of recollections fly in the face of
probabilities that prevail in the gambling world where Lady Luck does not rule. Odds of winning are deliberately and invariably
shifted to favor the house, leaving to the gambler the higher odds of losing. Over time close independent accounting will reveal
that the great majority of those playing against the house will lose more than
their accumulated winnings. So much for
That being the case, how to explain all those gamblers
reporting far more memories of winning than losing? Are
they all liars? Not so. Those who lie deliberately to avoid some negative
consequences constitute a small minority. The
overwhelming community of gamblers truly
believe they are telling the truth about the outcomes of their past gambling experiences. Else, why would they continue to pursue further gambling activities?
When pressed, some will plumb their previous
recollections and admit, Oh yes, now that you mention it, I do remember some losing
times. Then they will counter quickly
with, Sure I lose sometimes, but each time my losses were within the budget I had
set for gambling. And besides, I enjoy
gambling, and I count losses as the price I pay for my entertainment.
This rationale, plus the expectation of really having a
big win someday, keeps gamblers happily returning to their favorite games month after
month and year after year - to the even greater enjoyment of the gambling industry.
Are the somewhat distorted memories of ordinary regular
gamblers much different from the stories told by ordinary devoted fisherman about the
outcomes of their past pursuits and their hopes of landing a whopper next time out? Arent we
all heir to inadvertently editing our initial perceptions of an event, or series of
events, leaving subsequent memories captive to that particular spin on what we
Recently two psychologists at Washington University in
St. Louis published a paper titled, Creating false memories. Their research confirmed that:
In watching a news program on TV, or reading a
book, or listening to a friends comments, we do not register the events literally as
they happen, but interpret them through our own organizational schemes.
We carry our own perceptions, thoughts, and reactions
into the mix.
Therefore, the version of the event that is encoded and
later remembered involves our personal reaction as part and parcel of the transaction.
We have no literal tape or video-recording of the events
of our past, but rather we retain a recording of the events as filtered through the
lens of our own perspectives and biases.
Moreover, as an inseparable part of the process of
perception, we superimpose inferences on our every interaction with the world. These inferences are largely automatic, and go
beyond what is actually seen, done or heard during a previous event. Therefore, we
later remember something we believe was actually said or done during the previous
encounter, when it was only inferred. Thus,
these later remembered facts are in fact false memories about lesser or
greater components of that prior experience.
Recall that the title of this paper is Memories:
True or False. I must now confess that
such a polarity in the pure and absolute sense simply cannot exist.
This leaves us with memories that are mostly true, or
somewhat true, or kind of true renditions of past events.
And among the recollections of past events in our lives are honest-to-goodness false
memories. These are reported memories
of things or events that in objective reality never existed or happened, but which the
individual insists did occur, and will swear to that effect in a court of law. We all are aware of examples of this sort from
conflicting reports of eyewitnesses recounting their memories - even short term memories -
of a sudden unexpected event: an accident, a purse snatching, a drive-by shooting.
Memories, whether mostly true or false, tend to become
further modified with the increased passage of time, or because of the emotional
involvement of the person when the event occurred. Or
simply whether the person recalling events that happened during an early life epoch is a
younger or an older person.
Mark Twain said it well:
When I was younger, I could remember anything,
whether it happened or not; but my facilities are decaying now, and soon I shall be so I
cannot remember any but the things that never
happened. It is sad to go to pieces like
this, but we all have to do it.
Research confirms that with age we do not remember as
well what did happen to us, but remember more readily events that did not occur.
I have long been a student of how we perceive the events
in our lives, and what we later recall, and what we choose to report to others
about our memories. As a clinical
psychologist I have, worked with many patients in crisis counseling and in psychotherapy
who have experienced one or another kind of recent or long past trauma, and are now
struggling to deal with their convoluted memories of these events, so that they can move
forward with their lives.
Half a century ago my interest in this area of human
experience, piqued by the then continuous arguments between psychoanalytic and learning
theorists about the phenomena of memory and forgetting, led me to conduct my doctoral
research on this topic. It continues to
interest me that the questions about what constitutes true or false memories, first
explored in laboratories by my predecessors over a hundred years ago, are very much with
us today. Not only in continuing experiments
in psychological and neurophysical laboratories and in psychotherapy rooms, but also in
criminal justice interrogation rooms, and in courtroom testimony of adults and children
about their allegations of early childhood abuse by caregivers.
In all the above settings the shared concern is that
what actually happened during a past
event does not necessarily produce an unedited statement of recall for an interested
listener. In such settings recall always is
suspect; not by veracity alone, but because even the most candid remembering is sifted
through a fabric of original and subsequent inferences, and is further influenced by
ones anticipations of social acceptance or rejection, self-incrimination or
self-enhancement, potential financial gain or loss, etc.
Moreover, all memories, including false memories, remain highly susceptible
to modification through suggestion by others, particularly by authority figures such as
police and mental health professionals.
Case Study #1
When patients present to psychotherapists with
complaints of debilitating panic attacks, addictions and other personality problems, the
question of past contributing traumas often arises. Allegations
by an adult patient about early childhood neglect or abuse, including sexual abuse, by a
family member or caregiver are not unusual, and with very few exceptions are dealt with
appropriately and successfully during the course of therapy. However, on rare occasions an egregious example of
unprofessional management of a patient professing such memories does hit the courts and
the papers. In the case study that follows
the argument between the opposing lawyers hinged on whether the patients memories of
her past behaviors were true or false, or suggested by her psychotherapists. Ill quote portions of an article titled,
Indictment fuels repressed-memory debate, that appeared in the Feb. 1998 issue
of the APA Monitor, a publication of the American Psychological Association.
Between 1986 and 1992, while undergoing treatment
at Rush-Presbyterian-St. Lukes Medical Center in Chicago, Patricia Burgess claims
she was convinced by her psychotherapists that she had recovered memories of participating
in a cannibalistic satanic cult, being sexually abused and abusing her own sons. As a result of these purportedly recovered
memories, Burgus sons, age 4 and 5, were also hospitalized.
Eventually Burgus, whose treatment included two and a
half years of inpatient care and cost her insurance company nearly $3 million, concluded
that her supposedly recovered memories were false. She then
brought a lawsuit
against the hospital and
the mental health professionals who treated her. On Nov. 6, 1997,
while the defendants admitted no wrongdoing,
continued to defend their treatment and strongly opposed
any settlement, their malpractice
insurance carriers agreed to pay Burgus $10.6 million in damages. (Charles P. Ewig, J. D., Ph.. D.)
Case Study #2
The Burgus settlement came just a week after the most
recent, unprecedented development in a similar case.
In 1991, Lynn Carl sought admission to Spring Shadows Glen Hospital, a private
psychiatric facility in Houston. What was to
have been a two-week evaluation turned into 22 months of inpatient treatment costing an
estimated $1.1 million. During treatment on
the hospitals dissociative disorders unit, Carl became convinced that she had 500
different personalities; had been raised in a multigenerational, homicidal, cannibalistic
and satanic cult; had abused her children; and had tried to poison her husband.
As a result of Carls purportedly recovered
memories, she and her husband divorced, and her children, then 13 and 14, were also
admitted to Spring Shadows Glen Hospital. While
hospitalized, the children also came to believe that they had been involved in the same
cult. Carls 14-year old son reportedly
recalled being programmed by cult members to die at the age of 16. Her daughter supposedly believed that she had been
used as a breeder for the cult. Both
children also came to believe that they had been victims of incest. Carl sued the hospital and a number of mental
health professionals involved in her treatment, claiming that the therapy she received had
implanted false memories. While other
defendants settled out of court, the psychiatrist who treated Carl went to trial denying
any wrongdoing and alleging that Carl was suffering from multiple personality disorder,
had been abused and had abused her children.
Indictment follows judgment
In August 1997, a federal jury awarded Carl $5.9 million
in actual damages resulting from the defendants failure to obtain informed consent
or to disclose that the memories reportedly recovered through hypnosis and psychotherapy
might not be reliable. Despite this large
award, the legal woes facing the defendants in this case did not stop with a mere money
judgment. On Oct. 29, 1997, a federal grand
jury in Houston indicted one of the hospitals administrators, two psychiatrist, a
psychologist and a psychotherapist on charges that they fraudulently collected millions of
dollars in insurance payments by convincing seven patients that they suffered from
multiple personality disorder as a result of their involvement in abusive cults. Each of the 60 counts in the indictment (one
alleging criminal conspiracy and 59 claiming fraud) carries a possible prison sentence of
up to five years and a fine of $250,000.
Although many patients have filed lawsuits throughout
the United States alleging that therapists have implanted false memories of sexual abuse,
the indictment in this case appears to be the first to allege criminal wrongdoing in
connection with recovered memories.
Critics of the indictment, including the International
Society of the Study of Dissociation, expressed concern about the federal government using
criminal law to set standards for diagnosis and treatment and predicted that the
prosecution may have a chilling effect on the practice of psychotherapy.
While the reliability of memories of abuse reportedly
recovered through hypnosis and other forms of psychotherapy remain controversial -- and
that controversy has been further fueled by this first criminal indictment -- the specter
of government prosecutors dictating professional standards in psychotherapy appears
greatly exaggerated. It must be noted that
the defendants in this criminal matter have not been charged with providing improper
mental health care, but rather with deliberately defrauding insurance companies. Interestingly -- some might say sadly -- any
damage done to their patients has been or will be addressed only in civil lawsuits; in the
eyes of the law, the only alleged crime victims here were the patients insurance
companies. (Charles P. Ewig, J.D., Ph.D.)
Cast Study #3
The general consensus among mental health professionals
is that the vast majority of tens of thousands of child sexual abuse accusations each year
are true. Most children display the capacity to produce accurate memories. However, under certain conditions, if they are
pushed and probed by investigators in ill-advised manners, they may be led to say things
that are false. And preschoolers three to
four years of age tend to be more easily influenced by suggestive interviewing than are
In June 1998 a Massachusetts Superior Court Judge threw
out the prior conviction of a day school
teacher accused of sexually abusing her charges, because he had evidence that the
childrens damning testimony had been unduly influenced by the prosecution
team. In his order he stated:
Overzealous and inadequately trained
investigators, perhaps unaware of the grave dangers
of using improper interviewing and investigative techniques, questioned these children and their parents in a climate of
panic, if not hysteria, creating a highly prejudicial and
irreparable set of mistakes, the judge wrote. These
grave errors led to the testimony of the children being forever tainted.
One might think that all this fuss about the hazards of
forcing recall of repressed anxiety - provoking materials, including the
production of false memories, was something that first saw the light of day in the late
1980's and 1990's. Not so.
As I mentioned in passing earlier in this paper, my 1953
doctoral dissertation may have anticipated and even offered some partial answers to the
repressed memories debate still raging today.
The title of my dissertation was Memory for anxiety-provoking words as
measured in a forced recall situation: A comparative study of a normal and a
Ill tell you at the outset that, as a feisty
graduate student, I was trodding on the toes of the then Mental Health
Establishment by having the temerity to design a study that challenged the then
sacrosanct repression hypothesis. But
Im getting ahead of my story.
Let me begin by introducing you to the then existing
theoretical and experimental background that provided the springboard for my clinical
investigation of factors affecting recall of an experimentally induced anxiety-provoking
[Excerpts from Dissertation]
EXPERIMENTAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND (circa 1950)
Early workers in psychology first considered forgetting
to be a function of the amount of time that had passed, the assumption being that the
memory traces of the brain wear away with the passage of time. The need for amplifying and amending this concept
soon became evident. How, for instance, did
it happen that of two events perceived at the same moment, one would be remembered and
other forgotten? The apparent answer was that
one of the events made a stronger impression. Subsequent
investigations of the effects of primacy, intensity, novelty and frequency of stimulation
threw further light on factors influencing strength of impression. However, the recognition of these variables did
not entirely answer the objections raised against the forgetting-through-time theory. The work of Barlett showed that there was no one
curve of forgetting. There were instead as
many curves as there were conditions which determined rate and content of forgetting. The search for additional determining conditions
for forgetting led workers to turn their attention to factors such as the needs of
the individual, his interest, past experience and motivation at the time of
learning and of recall. Increasingly, it was
felt that forgetting was anything but simple, that the passage of time was
secondary, and that the primary factors were the needs of the individual and his
attempts to satisfy them.
The next contribution made by laboratory and clinical
workers concerned the fact that forgetting was never complete. Forgotten material often was either
spontaneously recalled, or could be made available to the individual by the application of
certain techniques. Most psychologists agreed
that forgotten material was located somewhere in the nervous system, and
devised hypothetical constructs such as neural schemata, engrams, neurograms, and traces
to fill the gaps in immediate observation.
Consideration of motivational factors in recall and the
potential reversibility of forgetting led to hypothesis about processes which kept the
forgotten unavailable. Principal
among these was the repression hypothesis which stressed certain
motivational aspects of forgetting, and postulated a complicated theoretical system of
forces acting to initiate, maintain and disrupt the process of repression. Repression is defined as the act of
thrusting back from consciousness into the unconscious sphere ideas or perceptions of a
disagreeable or psychologically threatening nature.
The Question of Repression vs. Suppression. Laboratory experiments have largely ignored the
possibility that factors other than repression may explain why a subject withheld certain
material from recall. The most obvious
alternative explanation of results is that the individual has suppressed, rather
than repressed, certain unrecalled material.
It is generally assumed that in a laboratory situation
the subject will respond in a motivated and appropriate manner to test instructions. This expectation is based on the individuals
cultural conditioning which leads him to obey authority figures (i.e. the examiner), and
to put his best foot forward in the presence of his superiors (again
represented by the examiner). The latter
factor generally serves to enhance an individuals performance in the ordinary test
situation. However, it may also play an
inhibiting role if compliance with the examiners instruction leads the subject to
violate the social pretense he wishes to maintain. In
a repression experiment the subject is often called upon to verbalize taboo
material, or recall experiences in which he had appeared in an uncomplimentary light. In this situation the subject may compromise his
inclination to recall all he can by suppressing those items which he feels might incur the
displeasure or ridicule of the examiner. The
degree to which this is done would ultimately depend on the subjects assessment of the
relative benefits to be gained by recalling or suppressing recall for certain material at
the time of testing. The amount of material
suppressed by a subject also may be altered by the kind of
threat to recall present in a situation, and the amount of pressure to recall
brought to bear by the examiner.
This interplay of factors fostering and inhibiting
recall is readily recognized and substantiated by those with therapeutic experience. Alexander notes that there are two important
processes available to the individual for withholding objectionable material from the
therapist. One is repression; the other is a
conscious and voluntary process called suppression. Alexander explains how the patients need for
help and the therapists accepting attitude reduce emotional resistance to verbalize
suppressed material, and also how the technique of free association tends to thwart
suppression of recall. As a function of the
therapeutic procedure, the patient gradually learns to overcome his natural
reluctance to abandon his conventional facade and become entirely frank.
Haighs study of Defensive Behavior in
Client-Centered Therapy demonstrated that individuals will consciously withhold
certain material if it tends to be incongruous with a particular concept or experience
highly valued by them. This was termed
defensive behavior which included his clients attempts to distort, deny,
evade, or rationalize their awareness of a given state of affairs. It was shown that the accepting attitude of the
therapist, and the clients need to work out inconsistent feelings, tended to reduce
the effectiveness and increase the admission of defensive behavior. Haigh concluded that:.it is necessary to recognize
that difference between material of which the individual is aware but which he does not
communicate, and material of which he is not aware but nevertheless influences his
behavior. It would seem that this factor (the
former) must be separated out before any defensiveness encountered need be attributed to
the operation of unconscious factors.
Even the recognition of factors such as suppression has
done little to clarify the experimental question of what is repressed and what is not. This is true in spite of the clear theoretical
dichotomy existing between repression and suppression.
Theoretically, the basis for differentiation is that repression is an unconscious,
and suppression is a conscious process. Unconscious
processes, including repression, follow three propositions:
they are removed from consciousness;
they can only be made available to consciousness by special techniques such as
psychoanalysis or hypnosis; and
they are not under voluntary control.
Suppression, on the other hand, is a conscious process,
easily reversible (i.e. suppressed material is provisionally, if not readily, available
for verbalization), and under voluntary control.
To the observer, however, the processes of
repression and suppression are the same: both prevent the verbalization of certain
material. The laboratory worker, unlike the
therapist, seldom goes beyond the recall data given at the time of inquiry. When experimental results reveal that certain
material is not verbalized, it has been largely a matter of conjecture whether repression
or suppression best explain the findings.
Limitations of the Experimental Criterion for
Repression. In traditional psychophysical
experiments the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness was determined by
asking the subject whether or not he was aware of a certain stimulus. If he response in the affirmative, he was
conscious of it; if not, he was unconscious of it. With
only minor modifications this same criteria has become standard in studies of recall. One simply asks the subject to recall previously
learned material. Response is the criterion
for consciousness; absence of response is the criterion for unconsciousness. However, this criterion may attribute much to
unconsciousness which in fact is wholly conscious.
One alternative solution occurred to me (then as a
graduate student in early 1950's). If one
cannot differentiate between repression or suppression of recall in the laboratory, can
one devise a method that would support the assumption that repression is not a
tenable explanation for obtained results? This
would not solve all the problems, but it would lessen the margin of error.
According to psychoanalytical theory, repressed memories
are not consciously available to the individual; only special techniques (i.e. therapy or
hypnosis) which serve to reduce ego threats to recall can release repressed content. Therefore, no amount of direct encouragement or
forcing could be expected to secure repressed material.
One method for testing whether previously unrecalled
anxiety-provoking material was, or was not, repressed would be to place the
subject under additional pressure to recall. If,
as a result, more memories for anxiety-provoking material are produced, a
previous assumption of repression would become untenable.
The importance of motivation in a recall situation is
noted by McGeoch:
What is recalled both immediately and after an
interval is a function of the motivation of the subject, whether at the time of
original learning or at the time of recall or at both, and of the influence of his
existent organization of learned material. It
is, thus, not the immediate material alone which
determines recall, but its interaction with motivation and the retained
residue of prior learning.
Therefore, I contended: after equal practice on given
word lists, including equal numbers of neutral and anxiety-provoking words, subjects
tested under Forced Conditions will be expected to recall more words from both lists than
those tested under Spontaneous Conditions. However,
Dembos results show that placing a subject under pressure to perform leads him to
produce responses inapplicable to the task at hand. Consequently,
I contended: in a recall situation one also would expect more unrelated (i.e. extra-list)
words to be produced under Forced than under Spontaneous Conditions.
Much previous experimentation has shown that
anxiety-provoking material is not recalled spontaneously.
A question often raised is that this content may be suppressed because of the
subjects embarrassment to report socially-unacceptable material to the examiner.
Investigations by Alexander and Haigh have demonstrated
that patients in therapy do suppress what they feel to be objectionable. These workers
found that with additional encouragement or insistence by the therapist, patients often
revealed previously withheld material. Therefore,
I anticipated that subjects tested under Forced Conditions will recall more
anxiety-provoking words than those tested under Spontaneous Conditions.
Summary Statement of the Problem.
Criticisms of experiments dealing with memory for anxiety-provoking material have
held that the experimental criterion for repression may be inadequate because subjects do
not report all they are capable of remembering in a recall situation. Studies in therapy have tended to support the
contention that socially-unacceptable material is often consciously withheld from report. Certain methods for encouraging the release
of suppressed material have been used in therapy. However,
there is disagreement regarding the validity of recollections secured by forcing
procedures, particularly in psychoanalysis.
In summary, my investigation attempted to demonstrate that by inducing greater
motivation to recall one can secure more recollections of previously-learned material. It was expected that subjects will be led to
report more anxious-provoking materials under Forced than under the traditional
Spontaneous Recall Conditions. It also was anticipated that placing individuals under
pressure to recall will result in their making more errors in recall (i.e.
false memories) than will persons not subjected to such conditions.
The literature on the effects of extreme anxiety on
learning suggests that neurotic subjects will be less able to retain
previously-learned materials than will normals of comparable age and intelligence. Other workers have noted that lesser ability to
suppress anxiety-provoking material is the greater proneness to disorganization
characteristics of neurotic individuals. This
suggests, then, that neurotic will produce proportionately more anxiety-provoking and more unrelated material than will normals in a
The problem of testing these assumptions will be
approached by the use of work lists consisting of equal numbers of
anxiety-provoking and neutral items which the subjects will learn
prior to the recall task. In this manner a
control of the content of recalled materials is established, since the analysis will be
based on the number of words recalled from the lists under Forced and Spontaneous
Conditions. A further measure of the validity
of recalled material is provided by the number of unrelated (i.e. extra-list) words (i.e.
false memories) produced under the two recall conditions.
Spontaneous Conditions approximately the usual
method of asking the subject to write down as much of a given past event as he could
remember. The instructions for this condition
were as follows: Write down as many of the words, that I gave you, which you
can remember. No additional comments
were made by the examiner. The subject was
free to work on his own during a five minute period, and was allowed to stop any time he
indicated that he was finished. Note was
made of the time each subject spent in recall.
Forced Conditions involved a constant pressure on
the subject to produce as much recall as he possible could. Under these conditions the examiner took an
active encouraging-coercing role. Initial
instructions for this condition were:
You have 5 minutes to write down as many of the
words, that I gave you, which you can remember.
Try to remember as many words as you possible can.
At the end of the third minute of recall the subject was
told Keep trying. You
still have two minutes to go. If you are not sure, guess.
But try to remember as many words as you possibly can.At the end of the forth
minute of recall the subject was again told:
You still have another minute to go. Try
to remember as many words as you possibly can.
It was hypothesized that groups tested under Forced
Conditions would: (a) recall more list words and produce more total responses; (b) recall
more anxiety-provoking words from the lists; and (c)
produce more extra-list words, than comparable groups tested under Spontaneous
Conditions. The results supported these
hypotheses to a statistically significant degree.
A comparison of normal and neurotic performance
supported the hypotheses that normal groups would show greater total recall for
list words than neurotic groups under both experimental conditions. The final hypotheses were that neurotic groups
would recall proportionately more anxiety-provoking words, and produce proportionately
more extra-list words (i.e. false memories) than normal groups under both the
Spontaneous and Forced Conditions. Although
in the predicted direction, the results of these comparisons were not statistically
Implications regarding the use of forcing procedures in
therapy, the experimental criterion for repression, the effects of pervasive anxiety on
learning and recall, and the limitations of the Spontaneous method of measuring learning
were discussed. It was suggested that the
forced techniques used this experiment may be fruitful in further empirical investigations
of the effects of motivation on recall.
[End of excerpts from Dissertation]